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I. INTRODUCTION
What we do know about the facts surrounding global warming,
or - more accurately - climate change, is as significant as what we
do not know. The scientific evidence about climate change is
mottled, and the actions taken to address the phenomenon are as
notable as those not taken. Moreover, even the apparently scientific
issues have become subsumed within the political milieu of
* Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law, University of Colorado at
Boulder. Professor of Law, Director, National Energy-Environment Law & Policy Institute,
University of Tulsa. I am indebted to Matthew Hawkins, 3L Tulsa, for his valuable assistance.
This essay is based on the year 2000 Distinguished Lecture on the environment, delivered at
The Florida State University at Tallahassee. I am much obliged to the Journal of Land Use &
Environmental Law and the Journal of Transnational Law & Policy for facilitating this event
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sustainable development (SD). Consequently, the next dimension in
the evolving saga of climate change must confront the question of
how to respond to climate change while engaged in SD. The
challenge of devising policies, laws, and institutions that begin to
address this question is a daunting one. The instant essay attempts
to explore this next dimension.
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol),1 signed in 1997, though
not yet in force,2 constitutes the most important attempt of the inter-
national community to give concrete expression to the umbrella
undertakings embodied in the 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).3 Although the Kyoto
Protocol begins in Article 2 by paying ritual respect to SD,4 the rest of
the Protocol effectively ignores its meaning or application to climate
1. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (1997), reprinted in 37 I.LM. 32 (1998)
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
2. Article 24 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that the Protocol will enter into force the
ninetieth day after at least 55 Parties aggregating at least 55% of the total carbon dioxide
emissions for 1990 of the Parties in Annex 1, have deposited their instrument of ratification. See
id. art. 24, reprinted in 37 I.L.l at 41.
3. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Framework Convention on
Climate Change, opened for signature June 4, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC
defines climate change in article 1(2) as a "change of climate which is attributed directly or
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is
in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods." Id. art. 1(2),
reprinted in 31 I.LM. at 853.
4. Article 2(l) provides in part: "Each Party included in Annex I in achieving its
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to
promote sustainable development, shall .... ", Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2(1), reprinted
in 37 J.L.M. at 32. The phrase "sustainable development" is also used in Articles 10 and 12(2).
Article 10 provides in part-
All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development
priorities, objectives and circumstances, without introducing any new
commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaffirming existing
commitments in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and continuing
to advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve
sustainable development, taking into account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5
and 7, of the Convention, shall ....
Id. art. 10, reprinted in 37 I.L. at 36-37. Article 12(2) reads:
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties
not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist
Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.
Id. art. 12(2), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 38.
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change. This essay argues that the Kyoto Protocol is a deeply flawed
agreement that negates SD for a number of reasons. First, it excludes
developing countries that will be emitting more carbon dioxide than
the developed countries after the next thirty years.5 The total
exemption of developing countries from even voluntary reductions
of carbon dioxide invalidates the environmental dimension of SD. A
removal of any form of environmental self-restraint is tantamount to
an unfettered freedom or liberty to cause global pollution and
damage and effectively disembowels SD.
In this context, I further argue that the United States committed a
major diplomatic and policy blunder by signing both the
misconceived Berlin Mandate6 at the First Conference of the Parties
(COP-i) 7 in 1995 and the 1996 Geneva Declaration8 at COP-2, in-
structing negotiators to seek short-term, legally-binding emission
control targets and timetables confined to participating (developed)
countries at COP-3, which was scheduled to be held in Kyoto in 1997.
The U.S. Senate responded to both resolutions of the COP by
unequivocally declaring that the United States should not be a party
to any mandatory reductions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) unless the
developing countries were also parties to such an agreement.9 This
5. See Mark A. Drumbl, Does Sharing Know Its Limits? Thoughts on Implementing
International Environmental Agreements: A Review of National Environmental Policies, A
Comparative Study of Capacity-Building, 18 Va. ENVTL L.J. 281, 286 (1999).
6. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its First Session, Held at Berlin from 28 March to
7 April 1995, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its First Session,
UNFCCC, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995) (visited May 22, 2000)
<http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/copl/07aOl.pdf> [hereinafter Berlin Mandate]. In
signing the Berlin Mandate, developed countries agreed to act first in reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions before requiring developing countries to do so. See id. art. I(1)(d).
7. The Conference of the Parties is an institution developed by the UNFCCC as a
policymaking body authorized to review periodically the implementation of the UNFCCC. See
UNFCCC, supra note 3 art. 7, reprinted in 31 I.IM. at 860-62.
8. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Second Session, Held at Geneva from 8 to 19
July 1996, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Second Session,
UNFCCC, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1 (1996) (visited May 22, 2000)
<http://www.unfccc.de/resource/docs/cop2/15aO1.pdf> [hereinafter Geneva Declaration].
9. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 CONG. REc. S8113-05 (daily ed. July 25, 1997)
(enacted) [hereinafter Senate Resolution Regarding UNFCCC. The Senate Resolution provides
in pertinent part:
Resolved, That...
(1) the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or
thereafter, which would -
(A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas
emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement
also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce
Summer 2000]
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rebuff left the Clinton Administration scrambling to preserve its in-
ternational image, while domestically committing to the idea that
costly carbon dioxide reductions were necessary in order to save the
world. The selling of this domestic objective necessitated inter-
national success, and reaching some kind of accord became the
dominant focus of the negotiations. 10 The result was the unfortunate
Kyoto Protocol.
The second major flaw in the Kyoto Protocol is that it repudiates
SD by virtually ignoring the importance of research and develop-
ment (R&D) in finding alternatives to fossil fuels. There is hardly
any mention in the Kyoto Protocol of the need for serious long-term
R&D into alternative fuels without which attempts to cut down fossil
fuel use would be almost futile.11 Costly cuts in carbon dioxide
emissions can only succeed if they also strike a balance between
economic development and environmental protection. It is not
possible to strike this balance, required by SD, without developing
other sources of readily accessible and cheap energy such as nuclear,
solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and hydrogen energy.
12 The Kyoto
Protocol failed to address this question.
Third, the Kyoto Protocol indulges in short-term gain at the cost
of long-term benefits. The Kyoto Protocol may have allowed
political leaders to spin an international success story, but did little to
address the more important, long-term climate issues at stake.
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same
compliance period, or
(B) would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States; and
(2) any such protocol or other agreement which would require the advice
and consent of the Senate to ratification should be accompanied by a
detailed explanation of any legislation or regulatory actions that may be
required to implement the protocol or other agreement and should also be
accompanied by an analysis of the detailed financial costs and other
impacts on the economy of the United States which would be incurred by
the implementation of the protocol or other agreement.
Id. at S8138-39.
10. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1998).
11. The only mention of the role of research and development is in Article 2(1)(a)(iv) of
the Kyoto Protocol, wherein the developed countries of Annex I are urged to "[i]mplement
and/or further elaborate policies and measures" for the "[promotion, research, development
and increased use of new and renewable forms of energy." See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1,
arts. 2(1)(a), 2(1)(a)(iv), reprinted in 37 I.LN at 32.
12. See Henry D. Jacoby et al., Kyoto's Unfinished Business, 77 FOREIGN AFF. July/Aug.
1998, at 54, 66; See also Laura H. Kosloff, linking Climate Change Mitigation with Sustainable
Economic Development: A Status Report, 3 WIDENER L SYMP. J. 351, 364 (1998) (discussing effect
of Kyoto Protocol as only a first step in changing future patterns of energy use and
development).
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Consequently, the next decade may be spent quibbling over these
demanding short-term commitments while ignoring more important
century-scale solutions.13
The Kyoto Protocol is also fraught with significant other perils. It
is very likely that countries might fail to meet even their immediate
goals, and that the Kyoto Protocol will not be ratified in the United
States.14 The failure to meet deadlines coupled with inaction by the
United States might have the effect of discrediting the entire inter-
national response to climate change, and will obstruct collective
action in the future - no matter how serious the problem turns out
to be.15 The result is a treaty that does not make environmental,
economic, or political sense. In this essay, I argue that we should
ignore the Kyoto Protocol and concentrate instead on negotiating. a
long-range protocol on GHG emissions.
13. Proof of the lack of agreement on implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is readily seen
in subsequent efforts of the COP after Kyoto in COP-4 and COP-5, held in Buenos Aires and
Bonn, respectively. The Fourth COP met from Nov. 2-13, 1998 in Buenos Aires with the
objective of ironing out details of the Kyoto Protocol, but ended up setting a further two year
schedule for future negotiations in the so-called "Buenos Aires Plan of Action." See Anita
Margrethe Halvorssen, Climate Change Treaties-New Developments at the Buenos Aires
Conference, 1998 Y.B. CoLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 1-2 (1998); See also Comment, As the
Globe Warms, ARI. DAILY STAR, Dec. 29,1998, at 10A, available in 1998 WL 22300739 (discussing
significant remaining conflicts after COP-4). The Fifth COP met at Bonn from 25 October to 5
November 1999, but recognized that work remained to be done on developing a framework of
elements of procedures and mechanisms related to the Kyoto compliance system. See Report of
the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session, Held at Bonn from 25 October to 5 November 1999,
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fourth Session, at 35 (preliminary,
unedited version) (visited May 24, 2000)
<http://cop5.unfccc.de/resource/docs/cop5/copdecis.pdf>.
14. The Clinton Administration signed the Kyoto Protocol in Buenos Aires at COP-4 in
November of 1998, but in order for the agreement to bind the United States domestically, the
approval of two-thirds of the Senate is constitutionally required. See Peter N. Spotts, Scientists
Call for Action on Global Warming, CHRSTIAN Sa. MONITOR, Jan. 29, 1999, at 4. Even if the
Kyoto Protocol is not approved by the Senate, it may be possible that the President could adopt
it as a policy framework. See Mitchell F. Crusto, All That Glitters Is Not Gold: A Congressionally-
Driven Global Environmental Policy, 11 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 511 (1999); See also James
P. Lucier, Globally Warm, Economically Cool, INSIGHT MAG., Dec. 28, 1998, at 18, available in 1998
WL 21496730 (discussing methods of implementing the Kyoto Protocol without Senate
ratification). In the meantime, the Clinton Administration has continued to advocate domestic
budgetary allowances for purposes of curbing GHG emissions, and the President's fiscal year
2001 budget seeks $4 billion for climate change initiatives and research. See Budget Asks $4 BN
on Climate Change; Gives Tax Breaks to C/ean Cars, OCTANE WEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, available in 2000
WL 4312205.
15. See Jacoby et al., supra note 12, at 55-56.
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II. FACTS AND COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
A. Agreed Facts
GHGs16 enable the earth to trap infrared radiation which warms
surface temperature while at the same time permitting excess heat to
escape. 17 The earth must radiate energy away in an amount equal to
that absorbed from the sun, if surface temperature is to remain in
balance. 18 GHGs, at their natural level, maintain such a heat
balance.19 In the right quantities, GHGs help support life and eco-
systems on earth by maintaining a relatively constant surface
temperature that averages nearly 60oF or about 15°C.20  The
functioning of the greenhouse effect on earth may be supported by
comparing the atmosphere and average temperature of Venus and
16. Major GHGs contributing to global warming are carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons,
methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone. See WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL
WARMING 15 (1992). The Kyoto Protocol includes three naturally occurring gases--carbon
dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide-as well as three synthetic compounds-
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. See Anastasia Telesetsky, The
Kyoto Protocol, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 797,801 (1999); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, Annex A, reprinted
in 37 I.LM. at 42.
17. This is commonly known as the "greenhouse effect." The theory posits that certain
gases and particles in an atmosphere preferentially allow the penetration of sunlight to the
surface of a planet relative to the amount of radiant infrared energy that is allowed to escape
back to space. See Stephen H. Schneider, The Greenhouse Effect: Science and Policy, 243 SCI. 771,
771 (1989).
18. The equilibrium in the earth's natural radiative budget, measured by watts per square
meter (wm-2), is theorized by analyzing the following description of earth's radiation balance:
Solar radiation into the earth's atmosphere is about 340 wm-2. Some 100 wm-2 is reflected
back to space by snow, ice, clouds and aerosols. The 240 wm-2 which is left warms the earth's
atmosphere and surface to about -18oC. On the other end, the earth's surface emits infrared
radiation of about 420 wm-2 into the atmosphere. The greenhouse effect redirects 180 wm-2
back to the earth, increasing the atmosphere and surface warming by about 33oC to
approximately 15oC. What is left of the emitted infrared radiation escapes and balances the net
incoming solar radiation. See Cline, supra note 16, at 15-16.
19. Because of the earth's radiative budget, an increase in atmospheric concentrations of
GHGs from anthropogenic emissions would mean that the greenhouse effect would redirect
more of the earth's emitted infrared radiation back to the surface, increasing global
temperature. In order to balance the budget, then, the earth would emit more infrared
emissions. See id. at 16. However, it should be noted that modifications in the climate do not
respond instantly to the change in atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. There is a "lag"
period before equilibrium is achieved. Hence, the increase in global average temperature
corresponding to increased GHG concentrations may not be cognizable for several decades.
See PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING: MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND
THE SCIENCE BASE 19 (1992) [hereinafter POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING].
20. SEE ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., THE HEATED DEBATE: GREENHOUSE PREDICTIONS VERSUS
CLIMATE REALry 8 (1992).
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Mars. The dense carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere of
Venus contributes to a very hot surface temperature (477oC), while
the low concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere on Mars
contributes to a much colder surface temperature (-470C).
21
Water vapor and clouds, which usually remain in the at-
mosphere for a week or so, are responsible for radiating upward-
flowing infrared light back to the surface of the earth.22 Long-lasting
GHGs, most notably carbon dioxide, however, are the central actors
in the climate change debate.23 Atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide and other long-lived GHGs have increased sub-
stantially over the past century.24 The increase in atmospheric con-
centrations of GHGs has corresponded to a decrease in the flow of
infrared energy to space, "so that, all else being equal, the earth re-
ceives slightly more energy than it radiates to space."25 This im-
balance contributes to a rise in temperature at the earth's surface.
26
Enormous quantities of trace GHGs are emitted into the at-
mosphere today through anthropogenic emissions. For example,
each year the burning of fossil fuels discharges six billion tons of
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.27 Many scientists fear such
anthropogenic emissions may be upsetting the environmental
21. See Cline, supra note 16, at 26.
22. One viewpoint is that approximately 75% of the natural greenhouse effect is due to
water vapor in the atmosphere. See William C. Bums, Global Warming-The United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Future of Small Island States, 6 DIcK. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 147 n.17 (1997) (citing AUSTRALIAN STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE
STUDY, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 13 (1995)).
23. See Jacoby et al., supra note 12, at 56. Measurements show that about 40% of carbon
dioxide released into the atmosphere stays there for decades at least, while 15% is incorporated
into the top layers of the ocean. It is unknown what happens to the remaining 45%. See POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 19, at 12. In addition to carbon dioxide,
other long lived GHGs are nitrous oxide, methane, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and
sulfur hexafluoride. See WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (J.T. Houghton et al., eds., 1996)
[hereinafter IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995].
24. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded in 1990 that
emissions of GHGs from human activities were contributing to substantial increases in
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
chlorofluorocarbons. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT xi (J.T. Houghton et al., eds., 1990).
25. Jacoby et al., supra note 12, at 56-57.
26. See Claire Breidenich et aL, The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315,316 (1998).
27. See D. Abrahamson, Global Warming: The Issue, Impacts, Responses, in The Challenge of
Global Warming 7 (D. Abrahamson ed., 1989). Further emissions in carbon dioxide, methane,
and nitrous oxide into the atmosphere can be attributed to other human activities like land-use
change and agriculture. See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 3.
Summer 20001
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balance hitherto maintained by atmospheric gases that blanket the
earth.28 They believe that if GHGs are allowed to build, this energy
balance will be upset, and trapped infrared radiation will cause a rise
in surface temperature.
29
Debate is seriously joined with respect to both the extent and im-
pact of global warming and how complex systems that determine
our climate will respond to changes in the concentrations of GHGs in
the atmosphere.30 Moreover, global warming is integrally connected
to the warming of the oceans, but it is not known just how rapidly
heat is carried into the ocean depths or whether oceanic organisms
can serve as carbon dioxide sinks.31 It is also not known to what
extent forests and vegetation on the terrestrial environment can act
as sinks.
32
In predicting climate, scientists use mathematical models with
complexities taxing the capabilities of even the world's largest com-
puters. To date, such models have not been able to include complete
"knowledge about the key factors that influence climate, including
clouds, ocean circulation, the natural cycles of greenhouse gases,
natural aerosols like those produced by volcanic gases, and
man-made aerosols like smog."33  According to the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in summary, the
main uncertainties in model simulations arise from the difficulties in
adequately representing clouds and their radiative properties along
with those of the atmosphere, the ocean, and the land surface.
34
28. Although anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide are small relative to the total
stock of carbon contained in the atmosphere, it is feared that even a small variation in natural
flows and stocks may upset the natural energy balance. See Cline, supra note 16, at 16-17. See
also JOHN FIROR, THE CHANGING ATMOSPHERE: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 51 (1990).
29. See JOSEPH CONSTANTIN DRAGAN & STEFAN AIRINEI, GEOCLIMATE AND HISTORY 142
(2d ed. 1989).
30. For an illuminating overview of the range of arguments in the climate change debate,
see BALLING, JR., supra note 20.
31. See Leslie Roberts, Report Nixes "Geritol" Fix for Global Warming, 253 Sc!. 1490, 1490
(1991). The UNFCCC defines a "sink" as "any process, activity or mechanism which removes a
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere." See
UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 1(8), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 854.
32. The common view is that forests take up about as much carbon dioxide while
photosynthesizing as they give off when respiring. A newer picture of forest dynamics suggest
that more carbon is stored in soils and peat than previously thought. Coupled with the
expansion of forests in certain parts of the world, improved use of forests worldwide could
help mitigate increased anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide. See Anne Simon Moffat,
Resurgent Forests Can Be Greenhouse Gas Sponges, 277 Sci. 315,315 (1997).
33. See Jacoby et al., supra note 12, at 57.
34. See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 31; See also Bums, supra note 22, at
156 n.47.
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Moreover, atmospheric general circulation models still exhibit in-
consistencies when their results are matched with climatic data of
past centuries. 35 "In addition, climate models are driven by forecasts
of greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn rest on highly uncertain
long-term predictions of population trends, economic growth, and
technological advances."36
Despite the fact that the awesome complexity of atmospheric
mechanisms cannot fully be replicated by mathematical models,37 a
majority of the scientific community agree that the greenhouse effect
will be enhanced by the increased atmospheric concentrations of
GHGs.38 Indeed, there is a strong general consensus among the
international scientific community that some action should be taken
now to limit or reduce atmospheric GHGs on a global basis, because
corrective actions will be ineffective after climate change has gained
momentum.
39
Further, a scientific consensus holds that atmospheric carbon
dioxide levels will increase between 100 and 200% by the year 2100 if
no changes are made to current policy and practice.40 This could
correspond to a mean global temperature increase of between 0.9
and 3.5oC, with a best estimate placing the increase near 2.5oC.
41
Over the past century, data reveals approximately a 0.50C increase in
average global temperature.42 This rise has not yet made a dis-
cernible difference to the earth's environment. Larger temperature
35. In studies of climate change of the past 18,000 years, general circulation model results
have not been able to match the paleoclimatic data. See P.M. Anderson et aL, Climatic Changes
of the Last 18,000 Years: Observations and Model Simulations, 241 SCi. 1043, 1051 (1988).
36. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 57.
37. See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 14 box 1; See also DRAGAN &
AIRINEI, supra note 29, at 27.
38. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451,456 (1993).
39. See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23; WORKING GROUP U1,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: S-IENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ANALYSES (Robert
T. Watson et aL, eds., 1996); WORKING GROUP I1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(James P. Bruce et al., eds., 1996).
40. "If carbon dioxide emissions were maintained at near current (1994) levels, they
would lead to a nearly constant rate of increase in atmospheric concentrations for at least two
centuries, reaching about 500 ppmv (approaching twice the pre-industrial concentration of 280
ppmv) by the end of the 21st century." IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 3.
41. See id. at 39.
42. See J.D. Mahlman, Uncertainties in Projections of Human-Caused Climate Warming, 278
Sci. 1416, 1416 (1997). IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 61 (estimating the mean
global warming over the past century to be between 0.3 and 0.6-C).
Summer 2000]
350 JOINTISSUE/LAND USE & TRANSNATIONAL
increases such as those now predicted to occur over the next century,
however, may cause a different result.
B. The Yea-Sayers
In 1988, the IPCC, currently composed of more than 2000 climate
change scientists,43 was formed jointly by the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) to evaluate the scientific phenomenon of global
warming and its effects on earth's community.44 These scientists and
climate change experts participate in three working groups and a
Task Force.45 The first assessment report of the working groups was
published in 1990. Updates followed in 1992 and 1994, along with
the second assessment report in 1995.46
The IPCC concluded in its original report that global climate
change might have its greatest impact in the polar regions, melting
polar ice caps and causing a rise in sea-level of about one meter by
the year 2100 and a rise in temperature of the surface ocean layer of
between 0.2 and 2.5oC.47 They predicted that climate changes will
affect agriculture, forestry, natural terrestrial ecosystems, hydrology,
water resources, human settlements, oceans and coastal zones,
seasonal snow cover, permafrost, and ice.48 Specific predictions were
difficult on a regional scale since climate varies regionally. The IPCC
supplements confirmed the original findings and provided
additional supporting data and a refinement of specific predictions.49
43. See Deborah E. Cooper, The Kyoto Protocol and China: Global Warming's Sleeping Giant,
11 GEo. INT'L ENvTL L. REV. 401,402 (1999).
44. A 1988 United Nations General Assembly Resolution endorsed the joint activities of
the WMO and UNEP. See G.A. Res. 43/53, U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
133, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1326 (1989).
45. See IPCC, About IPCC (visited May 22, 2000)
<http://www.ipcc.ch/about/about.htm>. Working Group I focuses on the scientific aspects
of climate change. See id. Working Group HI concentrates on the socio-economic impact and
positive and negative consequences of climate change. See id. Working Group M addresses
the options for limiting GHG emissions and mitigating climate change. See id. The Task Force
supervises the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme. See id.
46. The IPCC published its first assessment report in 1990, followed by a supplementary
report in 1992, a special report on radiative forcing in 1994, and in 1995, a second assessment
report. See U.S. Global Change Research Program, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (visited May 24, 2000) <http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/PCCINFO.htm>.
47. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC
IMPACTS ASSESSMENT 1 (W.J. McG. Tegart et aL, eds., 1990).
48. See id.
49. See generally WORKING GROUP I, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 1992: THE SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT TO THE IPCC SCIENTIC ASSESSMENT (J.T.
HOUGHTON Er AL, EDS., 1992); WORKING GROUPS I & III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
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According to the IPCC second assessment report in 1995, the most
pronounced impacts will be related to water resources. ° Rising
global temperatures will change existing patterns of precipitation,
which in turn will cause meteorological shifts affecting seasonal
snow patterns.51 Additionally, melting polar ice caps are expected to
cause a rise in sea level which will directly impact commercial
marine industries like shipping and fishing. 52 Sea level rises will also
severely challenge coastal land use.53 Agriculture will follow pre-
cipitation and temperature, and entire species will either adapt to the
new habitats, shift locations, or face localized and potentially wide-
spread extinction.54
Human settlements will also change as world population and
trading centers are typically located on coasts.5 5  Developing
countries and areas with significant lowlands may be unable to sur-
vive the health impacts of changing water and food supplies.56
Finally, human migration may disrupt settlement patterns and cause
social instability.57 In light of the fact, however, that global warming
may lead to winners as well as losers, diplomatic progress has been
inhibited by geographical differences in the impact of global warm-
ing effects and the remote manifestation of actual changes to the eco-
system.
C. The Nay-Sayers
The predictions of the IPCC have been challenged by a large
group of scientists. Since the UNFCCC was signed in 1992, dis-
senting scientists have expressed themselves through four petitions
culminating in the Oregon Petition signed by over 17,000 U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1994: RADIATIVE FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND AN
EVALUATION OF THE IPCC IS92 EMISSION SCENARIOS (J.T. Houghton et aL, eds., 1995).
50. See WORKING GROUP 11, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary
for Policyakers: Scientific-Technical Analyses of Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate
Change-IPCC Working Group II (visited May 22, 2000)
<http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/sarsum2.htm>, at § 3.2.
51. See id.
52. See id. § 3.1.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See WORKING GROUP III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 199 (James P. Bruce et
al., eds., 1996).
56. See id. at 189.
57. See id. at 199.
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scientists.58 To begin, some scientists contend that despite the
volume emitted by human activities, the accumulation of anthro-
pogenic carbon dioxide is really a tiny constituent of our atmosphere,
comprising about 4/100 of 1% of all gases present.59 A number of
factors related to Climate change remain uncertain, they say, in-
cluding the effects of clouds, 60 and there are a number of non-green-
house-related factors that may augment global temperature.61 They
further argue that carbon dioxide has been steadily increasing for the
last 11,000 years, coinciding with an interruption in the ice age and
the onset of global warming.62
One of the other issues on which they disagree with the IPCC is
whether the global warming the earth has experienced over the last
century is due to human intervention. It is admitted by the nay-
sayers that a 0.45oC warming has taken place during this last
century.63 What many of these scientists contend, however, is that
the temperature rise took place before 1940, prior to the huge in-
crease in carbon dioxide emissions, and that there has not been much
58. The petitions are: the 1992 "Statement by Atmospheric Scientists on Greenhouse
Warming" (more than 100 signatures); the 1992 "Heidelberg Appeal," (over 4000 signatures);
the 1996 "Leipzig Declaration" (signed by 130 U.S. climate scientists, including several who
participated in the IPCC); and the "Oregon Petition," which has been signed so far by 17,000
U.S. scientists. See Candace Crandall, Letter, The Number of Scientists Refuting Global Warming Is
Growing, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998, at A22. See also S. Fred Singer, Warming Orthodoxy
Ambush, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 4,1999, at A15.
59. See Andrew R. Solow, Is There a Global Warming Problem?, in GLOBAL WARMING:
ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES 7,8 (Rudiger Dornbusch & James M. Poterba eds., 1991).
60. Although clouds trap some heat, they reflect heat from the sun, in net, producing a
cooling effect on the planet. See Richard A. Kerr, Greenhouse Forecasting Still Cloudy, 276 Sci.
1040, 1040 (1997). The precise impact of clouds is not clear, however, and it is debatable
whether global warming will contribute to a change in this balance. See id. at 1041.
61. It is claimed, for example, that the IPCC has not paid sufficient attention to the
astronomical causes of global warming caused by the earth's orbital eccentricities as well as
variations in solar output. To illustrate the former, there are at least two competing orbital
mechanism theories that explain the occurrence of Ice Ages in the earth's past. The first theory
posits that cyclical changes in the earth's elliptical orbit shift the pattern of solar heating,
affecting the buildup of ice sheets. This has been termed the Milankovitch mechanisn. See
Richard A. Kerr, Upstart Ice Age Theory Gets Attentive But Chilly Hearing, 277 SCI. 183, 183 (1997).
The second, newer, theory proposes that ice ages were stimulated by changes in the inclination
of the earth's orbit relative to the plane of the solar system, causing the planet to be enveloped
in clouds of cosmic dust. See id. As for the latter theory, See Richard A. Kerr, A New Dawn for
Sun-Climate Links, 271 SCI. 1360, 1360 (1996) (discussing apparent sun-climate connection
resulting from the sun's eleven and twenty-two year sunspot cycles).
62. See S. FRED SINGER, HOT TALK, COLD SCIENCE: GLOBAL WARMING'S UNFINISHED
BUSINESS 5-6 (1997). However, some recent studies question the solidity of evidence showing a
constant buildup in carbon dioxide levels from the beginning of the Holocene epoch (about
11,000 years ago) to the present. See Curt Suplee, Studies May Alter Insights into Global Warming,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15,1999, at A7.
63. See BALLING, JR., supra note 20, at 68-69.
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change since 1940.64 They point out that National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites have been measuring
the temperature at a height of a few kilometers in the atmosphere
essentially over the entire earth since 1979.65 These records, based on
microwave sounding units (MSUs),66 have smaller systematic errors
than the surface records, which, unlike the satellite records, come
from a variety of instruments, techniques, and measurement
histories, and whose coverage is sparse over large areas like the
southern ocean.67 The very precise satellite record shows no net
warming over the last seventeen years, contrary to the forecasts cal-
culating the effect of the recent rapid increase in human-made
GHGs. 68 The results based on satellite data using MSUs are
supported by researchers whose observations are based on radio-
sonde data (weather balloons).69
An expert panel of the U.S. National Research Council (NRC)70
that attempted to reconcile the contradictory figures between surface
and atmospheric measurements has offered only a partial
explanation. In light of the panel's inability to explain the
differentials, they recommended the implementation of a worldwide
64. See S. Fred Singer, An Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, Transcript from Panel Discussion,
April 15, 1999, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 767, 771 (1999). Of the 0.46oC amount of warming
occurring from 1891 to 1990, it is contended that the amount of warming from 1891 to 1940 was
0.33oC. See Robert C. Balling, Jr., The Global Temperature Data, 9 RES. & EXPLORATION 201, 202
(1993).
65. See George C. Marshall Institute, Uncertainties in Climate Modeling: Solar Variability and
Other Factors (testimony of Sallie Baliunas, Ph.D., Senior Scientist of the George C. Marshall
Institute, before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources) (Sept. 17, 1996)
<http://www.marshal.org/baliunastestimony.htm> [hereinafter Uncertainties in Climate
Modeling]. The NOAA also has in place a Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
System providing climatological observation of the United States. See Charles Davies et al.,
Moving Pictures: How Satellites, the Internet, and International Environmental Law Can Help
Promote Sustainable Development, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1091, 1116 (1999). In addition, a
worldwide system of satellites to provide information on global climate is currently being
implemented through coordination by NOAA, NASA, and public and private operations in
several countries. See id. at 1116-17.
66. The radiometers aboard the NOAA satellites are MSUs designed to measure thermal
emission of radiation by atmospheric 02 at four frequencies near 60 GHz. See Roy W. Spencer
& John R. Christy, Precise Monitoring of Global Temperature Trends from Satellites, 247 SCL 1558,
1558 (1990). This can be accomplished because atmospheric 02 is constant in space and time
and ensures a stable temperature tracer. See id.
67. See id.
68. See Uncertainties in Climate Modeling, supra note 65.
69. See Dian J. Gaffen et aL, Multidecadal Changes in the Vertical Temperature Structure of the
Tropical Troposphere, 287 Sci. 1242, 1242 (2000).
70. See PANEL ON RECONcILING TEMPERATURE OBSERVATIONS, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNcI., REcONcILING OBSERVATIONS OF GLOBAL TEMPERATURE CHANGE (2000).
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monitoring system. Until more light is shed on this issue, the dis-
crepancies still remain largely unexplained.71
The nay-sayers further point out that temperatures have fluc-
tuated over the centuries and while the last 600 years have been cold,
it was warmer 1000 years ago, and even warmer 3000 years ago.7 2
According to them, it is untrue that the warming from rising GHGs
is going to be unprecedented in both magnitude and rapidity.7 3
Ocean sediment data of the past 3000 years discloses temperature
changes of 3-C (about 50F) taking place in a matter of a decade or
two.74 Such rapid temperature changes, they state, have happened
throughout recorded human history.75
Another method of measuring temperatures from the past is
drilling ice cores from the ice in the Arctic and Antarctic and taking
the samples to a laboratory where temperatures can be measured.76
These measurements reveal low temperatures during the last ice age
followed by a warming that began about 20,000 years ago and con-
tinuing to the present time.77 Prior to that time, it was considerably
colder, and a thick overlay of ice covered most of the northern
United States.78 The last 8000 to 4000 years, however, witnessed a
period of significant warmth called the "Climate Optimum."79 It
was followed in turn by a cooling period and another warming 1000
years ago, called the "Medieval Climate Optimum."80 This warming
enabled the Vikings to settle Greenland and cultivate crops, but was
71. See B.D. Santer et aL, Interpreting Differential Temperature Trends at the Surface and in the
Lower Troposphere, 287 SC. 1227, 1231 (2000). Three explanations have been forwarded to
explain the difference: first, there could be data problems in either the surface thermometers,
or the radiosonde and satellite data; second, the effects of natural internal variability and/or
external forcing may account for the difference; third, the difference could be related to
coverage differences between satellite and surface temperature data. See id. at 1227.




76. See Singer, supra note 64, at 772. The temperature at the time the ice froze can be
calculated by measuring isotopes of hydrogen and oxygen in the water molecules in the ice.
Air bubbles that are trapped in the ice record the amount of GHGs in the atmosphere. See
Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Global Issues: Policies And Dilemmas, 3 TOURO J. TRANSNAVL
L. 111, 117 n.17 (1992) (citing Eric T. Sundquist, The Greenhouse Effect and Global Warming:
Critical Questions and Essential Facts, in INFORMATION ON SELECTED CLIMATE AND CLIMATE-
CHANGE ISSUES (U.S. Geological Survey Open File Report No. 888-718) 11, 15 (1988); S.H.
Schneider, The Changing Climate, SQ. AM., Sept 1989, at 72; C. Lorius, A 150,000-Year Climatic
Record from Antarctic Ice, 316 NATURE 591,591-96 (1985)).
77. See Singer, supra note 64, at 772; See also D. Dahl-Jensen, Past Temperatures Directly
From the Greenland Ice Sheet, 282 SCL 268,270 (1998).
78. See Singer, supra note 64, at 772.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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followed, from about 1250 to 1850 A.D., by a period called the "Little
Ice Age," during which crop failures caused starvation.81 A sharp
recovery with warming then commenced at about 1850, reaching a
maximum temperature in 1940. According to the nay-sayers, then,
global warming theories cannot explain the temperature peaking in
the 1940s. 82
III. LEGAL RESPONSE
A. 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The international law response to the threat of global warming
was first expressed in the 1992 UNFCCC.83 Though there was a sub-
stantial political base which desired long-term quantitative emission
limits, eventually a "go-slow" approach prevailed. The short ne-
gotiating period, combined both with the enormous economic stakes
and a substantial amount of scientific uncertainty, resulted in the
adoption of only cautious controls in the final version of the treaty.84
The UNFCCC, however, is not an empty framework treaty
whose substantive details entirely await further elaboration; instead,
it is a framework convention with a number of built-in requirements.
Most significantly, developed countries must strive to reduce their
overall emissions of GHGs to 1990 levels by the year 2000.85 In
addition, developed countries have a general commitment to make
financial and technological transfers to developing countries.86
Furthermore all parties, both developed and developing countries,
must develop inventories of GHGs, as well as national mitigation
and adaptation programs.87 The UNFCCC, however, provides
different timetables and requirements for both categories of parties
with regard to inventories and other programs,88 and the COP has
established different guidelines for the national reports
communicating such programs to the COP.89
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. For an overview of the issues surrounding the global response to climate change, See
Bodansky, supra note 38, at 455-57,471-77.
84. See Ved P. Nanda, The Kyoto Protocol On Climate Change and the Challenges to Its
Implementation: A Commentary, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL L. & POL'Y 319,321 (1999).
85. See UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 4(2)(b), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 857.
86. See id. art. 4(3), reprinted in 31 I.Ll& at 858.
87. See id. arts. 4(1)(a) and 4(2)(a), reprinted in 31 I.L.M at 855, 856.
88. See id. art. 12, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 865-66.
89. See id. art. 12(5), reprinted in 31 AL.M. at 866.
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In mandating different requirements for developed and
developing countries, as well as making further delineations within
those groups, the UNFCCC embraces the concept of "common but
differentiated responsibility" (CBDR).90 This principle recognizes
that only international cooperation will help to resolve a problem of
the magnitude of global warming, but that in responding to the
problem, different states have different social and economic
conditions that affect their response capabilities. 91 CBDR also incor-
porates the equitable notion that developed countries, which have
the largest share of historical and current emissions of GHGs, should
take the first painful actions to ameliorate the problem.92 As we shall
see, however, the exact application of CBDR remains in controversy
concerning a number of issues.
B. 1997 Kyoto Protocol
The First COP (COP-I) assembled on March 28, 1995, in Berlin to
address additional commitments, financial mechanisms, technical
support to developing countries, and administrative and procedural
issues involving climate change. 93 A pressing issue was whether
Annex I Parties would be able to achieve the general emissions re-
duction goal heralded by the UNFCCC.94 As a result, the Berlin
Mandate was passed, under which developed countries agreed to
future negotiation of a protocol containing express targets and time-
tables for emissions reductions.95 The Berlin Mandate created an Ad-
Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) to meet periodically with
the function of determining how to strengthen the commitments of
Annex I Parties past the year 2000.96 This was to be concluded
ultimately in the form of a protocol, to be adopted at COP-3. The
AGBM met eight times between COP-1 in 1995 and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol conference in December 1997.
90. The concept of common but differentiated responsibility is explicitly referred to in the
Preamble and Articles 3 (dealing with principles) and 4 (dealing with commitments) of the
UNFCCC. See id. pmbl. and arts. 3-4, reprinted in 31 I.LL at 851-53, 854-56.
91. See Paul G. Harris, Common But Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol and
United States Policy, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL .J. 27, 29 (1999) (tracing the evolution of the concept of
"common but differentiated responsibility" from the notion of the "common heritage of
mankind").
92. See id. at 28.
93. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 411.
94. See UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 4(2)(b), reprinted in 31 I.L.M at 857.
95. See Nanda, supra note 84, at 326.
96. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 411.
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Further stimulus for negotiation of a protocol at COP-3 occurred
when, in April 1996, the IPCC published its 1995 second assessment
report finding that "the balance of evidence suggests a discernible
human influence on global climate." 97 Subsequently, COP-2 con-
vened in July 1996, producing several important developments. 98
First, the Parties published the Geneva Declaration, calling for
"legally-binding targets and timetables to ensure significant re-
ductions in GHG emissions," similar to the Berlin Mandate. 99
Second, the U.S. shifted its position toward a legally-binding agree-
ment to accomplish the objectives of the Berlin Mandate and
UNFCCC, a stance that the European Union had been advocating for
years.100 The remaining issue left for the COP-3 negotiations in
Kyoto was the establishment of legally-binding targets.10 1
In direct response to these developments, a unanimous Senate
Resolution in July 1997,102 passed during the run-up to Kyoto in
1997, clearly and unequivocally declared that the United States
should not be a party to any mandatory reductions of greenhouse
gases unless the developing countries were also parties to such an
agreement. Despite their full knowledge that any agreement re-
quired by the Berlin mandate would not be approved by the Senate,
the Clinton Administration felt obligated by the Berlin undertaking,
and publicly committed itself to an emission reduction agreement
restricted to developed countries alone, while taking its case to the
public over the heads of the Senate.1°3
Significant steps in the global response to climate change were
then taken at COP-3 in Kyoto in 1997 and at COP-4 in Buenos Aires
in 1998. After intense negotiation at Kyoto, the developed countries
agreed to reduce GHG emissions to five percent below their 1990
levels between the years 2008 and 2112.104 The Kyoto Protocol, em-
bodying this agreement, also provided a basis for emissions trading,
97. IPCC CLUIATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 4.




102. See Senate Resolution Regarding UNFCCC, supra note 9.
103. For an overview of the Administration's stance after the results of COP-2, See
Administration Statement, Global Climate Change Negotiations, Congressional Testimony by
Federal Document Clearing House, Sept. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13104202.
104. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3(1), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 33. The United
States agreed to a reduction of emissions of 7%, the Europeans to a reduction of 8%, and the
Japanese to a reduction of 6%. See id. Annex B, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 43.
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primarily between developed countries. 105 The Kyoto Protocol,
however, has not been ratified in the United States. Additionally, a
number of the industrialized (Annex I) countries have failed to carry
out the emission reductions to which they had aspirationally agreed
under the UNFCCC.10 6 The faltering attempts made at COP-4 in
Buenos Aries in 1998 did little to remedy this problem. Con-
sequently, the Kyoto Protocol's objectives of reducing GHGs, pri-
marily carbon dioxide, to a level that is five percent below 1990 dis-
charges by 2112, are receding into the distance and appear effectively
unattainable. But what is even more disturbing is that even if the
Kyoto Protocol were fully and faithfully implemented, GHGs will
double to their pre-industrial levels by the year 2100, and quadruple
within another 50 years.10 7
IV. WHY THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IS IRREPARABLY FLAWED
A. The Meaning of Sustainable Development
In 1983, the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment (WCED or Brundtland Commission) was constituted by the
General Assembly of the U.N., and charged with proposing long-
term environmental strategies for SD. 10 8 That elusive term was not
defined by the U.N., and despite the efforts of the Brundtland
Commission and the Earth Summit of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro (Earth
Summit),109 still eludes satisfactory definition. After four years of
deliberation, worldwide consultation and study, the Brundtland
Report, titled Our Common Future, articulated the paradigm on which
the Earth Summit, and indeed international environmental law, has
105. The Kyoto Protocol allowed for two types of implementation based upon: (1) joint
implementation between Annex I (developed) countries, including the creation of mechanisms
such as the creation of a "bubble" for the European Union and the clean development
mechanism (between developed and developing countries), and (2) emissions trading between
industrialized countries. See Nanda, supra note 84, at 328-29.
106. An estimate for the United States is that it will miss the hortatory year 2000 target of
the UNFCCC by 13%. See Paul E. Hagen et al., International Environmental Law, 32 INT'L LAW,
515, 517 (1997).
107. See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 25.
108. See Process of Preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond,
U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 47, 102d plea. mtg., at 131, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983).
109. The Earth Summit culminated in the creation of five primary documents: the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development; Agenda 21; the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC); the Convention on Biological Diversity; and the Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus of the Management, Conservation, and Sustainable
Development of All Types of Forests.
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since been based.110 In essence, it rejected the despairing thesis that
environmental problems were past repair, spiraling out of control,
and could only be averted by no growth that arrested development
and economic growth.111 Instead, it argued that economic growth
was both desirable and possible within a context of SD.
112
SD has come to be accepted as a foundational norm of
environmental law and policy by the international community.
Though proclaimed the grundnorm of international environmental
law since the Earth Summit, the concept admittedly still bears a
chimerical character and calls to be honed, refined and more clearly
defined. 113 While this process of development has been progressing,
a recent re-statement of SD, conceptualized by a group that includes
a significant number of Nobel Laureates, is worthy of particular
attention.114 The re-statement defines SD as the wise use of resources
through social, economic, technological, and ecological policies
governing natural and human-engineered capital.115 Such policies
should promote innovations that assure a higher degree of life
support for human needs fulfillment, across all regions of the world,
while ensuring intergenerational equity.
SD marks a departure from our thinking of the sixties and
seventies by recognizing that humans are part of the environment
and ought no longer to be treated as predators within the natural
systems of the world. Although SD was not dearly defined by the
Brundtland Report, some of its key attributes are identifiable. First,
it calls for developmental policies and for economic growth that can
relieve the great poverty of the least developed countries, while
protecting the environment.116 Second, development and growth
should be based on policies that sustain and expand the en-
vironmental resource base in a manner that meets the needs of the
110. See generally WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
111. See id. at 1.
112. See id. at 49-54.
113. See Ben Boer, Institutionalizing Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles of
National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into Action, 31 WILLAMETFE L.
REV. 307,317 (1995) (asserting that the concept is growing into an "environmental mandate for
the world"); See also Catherine Giraud-Kinley, The Effectiveness of International Law: Sustainable
Development in the South Pacific Region, 12 GEo. INT'L ENVTL L- REV. 125, 130-31 n.19 (1999)
(summarizing the current competing conceptions concerning SD's rise to a mandate of
international environmental law).
114. See Conceptual Framework, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SUPPORT SYTEMS (visited June
22,2000) <http://www.eolss.co.uk/CF.pdf > [hereinafter Conceptual Framework].
115. See id.
116. See OURCOMMON FUTURE, supra note 110, at 49.
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present generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.11 7 Consequently, SD was seen
as environmentally sensitive development that meets the needs of
the present generation without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs.1 18 From this standpoint, SD
gives parity of status to economic growth and environmental pro-
tection. It rejects economic development and growth that is not en-
vironmentally sensitive or destroys the resource base. Thus it em-
braces both development and environmental protection. 1 9
The iteration of SD that emerged at the Earth Summit was some-
what different. To begin, the intended "Earth Charter" was replaced
by the "Rio Declaration on Environment and Development" (Rio
Declaration),120 a title that diminished the environmental resonance
and status of that document.121 Second, the principles of the Rio
Declaration, when compared to those of the Stockholm
Declaration,122 stressed development at the expense of conserva-
tion.123 For example, the nascent right to a wholesome environment
embodied in the Stockholm Declaration was abandoned in favor of a
right to development (Principle 2) in the Rio Declaration.'24 The
obligation not to cause trans-frontier damage contained in Principle
21 of the Stockholm Declaration' 25 was weakened in Principle 2 of
the Rio Declaration by the addition of crucial language authorizing
117. See id. at 44; cf. Giraud-Kinley, supra note 113, at 130 (describing two basic elements
derived from the concept of sustainable development a temporal element calling for
maintaining natural resources at a renewable level for use by future generations; and a spatial
element "integrating economic and ecological factors in decision-making").
118. See OUR COMMON FuTURE, supra note 110, at 8.
119. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance,
49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 19 (1998).
120. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (vol. I) (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.LM. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
121. See Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable
Development: A Critical Assessment of the UNCED Process, 15 J.L. & COM 623, 628-29 (1996).
122. The Stockholm Declaration was produced by the 1972 United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment, a conference that was prompted by concerns of environmental
destruction around the world. The Stockholm Declaration articulated 26 principles grounded
in the objective of "inspir[ing] and guid[ing] the peoples of the world in the preservation and
enhancement of the human environment." Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (pmbl.) (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm
Declaration].
123. See Pallemaerts, supra note 121, at 630-36 (analyzing the Principles of the Rio
declaration as affirming the right of developmental imperatives over ecological requirements).
124. See Rio Declaration, supra note 120, princ. 2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 876.
125. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 122, princ. 21, reprinted in 11 I.L.ML at 1420.
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states "to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own en-
vironmental and developmental policies." 1
26
The obligation to conserve implied by the duty to protect the en-
vironment for the benefit of future generations found in the Stock-
holm Declaration is replaced in the Rio Declaration by a right to
consume or develop. The Rio formulation refers to "developmental
and environmental needs of present and future generations"
(Principle 3).127 This re-formulation impliedly negates or weakens
the obligation to conserve expressed in the Stockholm Declaration.
Finally, the Rio Declaration frowns upon action such as that taken by
the United States under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972128 to prevent the killing of dolphins by prohibiting imports of
tuna caught in dolphin killing nets. Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration states that "[u]nilateral actions to deal with en-
vironmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided." 129
Not surprisingly, some commentators, including the present
author, have argued that the Rio Declaration institutionalized a pre-
eminent right to economic development that enfeebled and
attenuated the ecological imperative of SD. 130 Such a claim is con-
firmed by language of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD).131 SD functions as a prevailing force and the ultimate ob-
jective of the CBD. 132
Despite these misgivings about what SD ought to mean, the hard
fact remains, however, that SD is about economic growth. Con-
sequently, the Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems Conceptual Frame-
work defines sustainable development as development that wisely
uses human and natural resources so as to "assure a higher degree of
126. Rio Declaration, supra note 120, princ. 2, reprinted in 31 I.LM. at 876 (emphasis
added).
127. Id. princ. 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 877.
128. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994).
129. Rio Declaration, supra note 120, princ. 12, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 878
130. See Pallemaerts, supra note 121, at 656; David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L REV.
599, 640-42 (1995).
131. See Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, June 5,1992, reprinted in 31 LL.M. 818 (1992).
132. The Preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity declares that "States are
responsible for conserving their biological diversity and for using their biological resources in a
sustainable manner," and that signatories are "[d]etermined to conserve and sustainably use
biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations." Id. pmbL, reprinted in 31
I.L.MI at 822, 823.
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human needs fulfillment, or life support."133 The life support
systems referred to are both natural and social systems that promote
human welfare. Thus "life support systems" are defined as "natural
environmental systems as well as ancillary social systems required to
foster societal harmony, safety, nutrition, medical care, economic
standards, and the development of new technology .. . that ...
operate in partnership with the conservation of global natural re-
sources." 134 These definitions give primacy to the pursuit of human
welfare and the betterment of human quality of life through the
prudential conservation of natural resources. The emphasis is clearly
on the advancement of human welfare and not the protection of the
environment or the preservation of natural resources for its own
sake. In sum, it would be fair to conclude that the balance in SD on
the international level is weighed in favor of development, not con-
servation.
The manner in which SD is being defined can have profound im-
plications for law, policy and institutions. As presently envisioned,
the promotion of human needs fulfillment is not countervailed by
environmental or conservationist constraints, except where en-
vironmental abuse might imperil human needs fulfillment. This per-
spective may be contrasted with the existing paradigm of U.S. en-
vironmental laws and policies as found in the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 135 Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (ESA), 136 the Wilderness Act,137 the Clean Air Act
(CAA)138 and Clean Water Act (CWA).139  These U.S. laws
institutionalize environmental protection as a value in its own right,
whether or not human needs are fulfilled or promoted.140 They
embody a concept different to sustainable development as presently
defined, based at least in part on a view of the environment and
ecology that is not scientifically supported.
Despite this paradigm shift, this essay maintains that the Kyoto
Protocol repudiated SD. The reason is that environmental protection
still remains an integral, albeit weakened, component of SD. The
prominence given to development in SD does not nullify the need to
133. Conceptual Framework, supra note 114.
134. Id. at 1.
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1994).
136. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1994).
137. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1994).
138. 42 U.SC. § 7401-7671q (1994).
139. 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387 (1994).
140. See infra notes 242-247 and accompanying text
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preserve or support the life support systems on which human
fulfillment is based. To do otherwise would be to destroy the pri-
mary source of human welfare. Moreover, when facing a global peril
of the magnitude of climate change, it is difficult to argue that a
common threat to global security does not call for common action.
Surely, there is no moral or ethical justification for allowing a de-
prived member of the family to fuel a deadly fire that is being put
out by the others.
B. Exemption of Developing Countries
The Kyoto Protocol remains an irreparably flawed instrument
because it exempts developing countries from even voluntary re-
ductions of carbon dioxide. By exempting developing countries
from any form of self-restraint, they have been freed and authorized
to pollute by relying on as much fossil fuel energy as they may
choose. The case of China illustrates how SD has been negated by
the Kyoto Protocol.141 China emits 14% of the world's GHGs in
comparison to the 22% emitted by the United States today. China's
modest contribution to GHG emissions in the past, however, stands
in bleak contrast to the future. China's energy consumption is
expected to rise with future economic development and rising
standards of living, causing carbon dioxide emissions to increase
dramatically. It is predicted that China's annual carbon dioxide
emissions could rise to 2380 metric tons of carbon by the year 2020, if
the expected energy consumption is met. In addition, because it is
anticipated that China will rely upon coal-fired power production for
the next 100 years, its emissions from energy use could expand from
"today's 0.7 billion tons to 3.2 billion tons by the year 2025." 142 In
that event, China's contributions alone would constitute 40% of
global emissions and would likely undercut whatever progress is
made by the emission reductions by those developed countries
implementing the Kyoto Protocol.
China's reliance upon coal-fired power production is aggravated
by the use of high-sulfur coal and the inefficient power plants.
143
High-sulfur coal is used because of abundance and ease of mining,
141. The following discussion of China incorporates substantially the research findings of
Deborah Cooper in her article examining the vast impact China is predicted to have on the
emissions of GHGs. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 404-07,416-17.
142. Id. at 404. However, a 1999 Energy Information Administration report stated that
coal production had started to drop in China. See Ken Ward Jr., 2000 and Beyond: The Future of
Coal, CHARLESTON GAzETTE & DAILY MAIL, Feb. 13,2000, at 1A, available in 2000 WL 2592532.
143. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 404.
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but vast amounts of energy go by the wayside when it is burned.144
This is because a typical Chinese power plant's efficiency rate is only
6%, as compared to a typical American power plant efficiency rating
of 36%.145 Accordingly, the Chinese have to use six times more coal
to produce an equivalent amount of U.S.-produced energy.
146
Moreover, reliance on this type of coal has caused severe air
pollution throughout China. Seventy percent of smoke or dust and
ninety percent of sulfur dioxide emissions stem from the burning of
coal.147 This severe level of air pollution causes nausea, dizziness,
lung cancer, bronchitis, pneumonia, and asthma.148 In fact, the
Ministry of Public Health reported the poor air quality was a con-
tributing factor in 26% of all deaths in China in 1988.149 This figure
has been corroborated by the World Bank, according to which
respiratory disease associated with air pollution is the leading cause
of death in China. 150 Air pollution of this magnitude has also caused
diminishing crop yields, and a shortage on the level of 100 million
tons of grain could occur by the year 2030.151
China's carbon dioxide emissions will be exacerbated by its
economic progress that leads to increases in the use of vehicles and
personal energy.152 Previously, more than one in three Chinese ex-
clusively used bicycles for transportation, but cars are increasingly
becoming status symbols. 153 The car industry has been embraced by
China as a foundation of its growing economy. By the year 2000,
China aims to produce three million cars per year for domestic
use.154 If vehicle use in China ends up paralleling the United States,
this would account for over 19% of the world's GHG emissions.
155
China's philosophy also opposes limits on personal energy con-





147. See Chenggang Wang, China's Environment in the Balance, WORLD & I, Oct 1, 1999, at
176, available in 1999 WL 11151439.
148. See Cooper, supra note 43, at 405.
149. See id. at 405-06.




154. See id. at 407.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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The picture thus is clear that China is not engaging in SD because
SD encapsulates economic development with due care for the en-
vironment.157 It embraces the idea that development can prevail
over simple preservationism but not that the environment ought to
be sacrificed for economic growth. Rather, development can
coincide with environmental consciousness, and must be sensitive to
environmental protection. SD is not a form of "ecocolonialism."
China's purported objective of avoiding "ecocolonialism," therefore
may be seen as an ill-disguised subterfuge for advancing its own
economic advantage at the expense of the global environment.
This becomes clear from China's negotiating position at Kyoto
which demonstrated that its desire to pursue economic development
trumps environmental goals. The position of China and other
countries like India and Brazil was that economic development is a
necessity, while environmental protection is a luxury that
developing countries cannot afford.1 8 In the words of Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Tang Guoqiang, China would "shoot
down any treaty that would hamper developing countries' hopes of
prosperity."159
There is no doubt that, in poor developing countries, problems of
poverty, famine, natural disaster and social unrest appear far more
real than any long term effects of global warming. It is also in-
controvertible that developing countries have a right to develop-
ment, recognized by the UNFCCC in Article 3(4) as "a right to ...
sustainable development" requiring each Party to "takfe] into
account that economic development is essential for adopting
measures to address climate change." 160 In addition, Article 3(5)
states that the Parties should cooperate to achieve "sustainable eco-
nomic growth and development in all Parties." 161 This premise is
incontestable, but as we have observed, environmental protection is
an integral, if diminished, component of SD and SD cannot just be
equated to development simplicitur.
The restriction of emissions reductions to developed countries
alone adversely affects SD in other ways. Carbon dioxide emission
157. See Sir Shridath Ramphal, Sustainable Development, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 680 (1994).
158. It appears, however, that the collective developing country consensus is becoming
fractious. See Cheryl Hogue, Climate Change: Once Solid Developing Country Bloc Dividing Into
Five or More Factions, 21 INT'L ENVT REP. (BNA) 1201 (Nov. 25, 1998).
159. Greenhouse Treaty Fight, S. CHINA MORNING POT, Nov. 30, 1997, at 6, available in 1997
WL 13272657.
160. UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 3(4), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 855.
161. Id. art. 3(5), reprinted in 31 I.L.L at 855.
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controls will raise the cost in participating countries of manu-
facturing those goods whose production requires substantial energy.
For these products, industries in developing countries such as China,
India and Brazil will gain an advantage over industries in countries
that adhere to emission controls. Hence, once developing countries
have invested in production facilities as part of their economic
development, they will be more reluctant to take emission control
measures that threaten these activities.
162
C. Environmental and Economic Nonsense
The Kyoto Protocol does not make environmental sense. The
core of the Protocol calls for the reductions of GHGs by at least 5%
below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.163 What happens if these
targets are perfectly met? The IPCC climate models dealing with
central scenarios predict 1.40C warming by the year 2050.164 If the
same models are run, computing for the Kyoto Protocol mandated
emission levels, there appears, under one viewpoint, only to be an
avoidance of one-twentieth of one degree of the predicted 1.4oC
warming. 165 Another view is that the Kyoto Protocol helps only to
the extent of a 16% reduction of global warming if that reduction is
held stable for the whole of the century.166 But, of course, as pre-
viously stated, reductions by developed countries alone cannot hold
reductions stable because the increasing emissions of developing
countries will more than compensate for reductions by developed
countries.
Historically, contributions to atmospheric GHGs have been made
by the industrialized countries, led in volume by the United States.
Unfortunately, forecasts for the next century show significant in-
creases in emissions from developing nations, and emissions from
such nations are projected to equal or exceed the amount emitted by
developed nations by the year 2030.167 In contrast to the positions by
developing countries, the U.S. Senate, as we have seen, resolved that
any responsibility for reducing carbon dioxide cannot be borne by
the developed countries alone. By 2010, developing countries are
expected to account for 45% of worldwide GHG emissions, and
162. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 60.
163. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. at 33.
164. See Russell Jones, An Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, Transcript from Panel Discussion,
April 15, 1999, 11 CEO. INT'L ENVTL L REv. 767,777 (1999).
165. See id.
166. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 63-64
167. See Drumbl, supra note 5, at 286.
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China and India will have greater growth in emissions than all
twenty-four member countries of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development combined. 168
The refusal of the developing countries to control their emissions
as part of the global effort to stabilize concentrations of GHGs pre-
sents a major diplomatic challenge.169 Current efforts to include
developing countries within the emission reducing framework of the
Kyoto Protocol have proven unsuccessful. 170 By any analysis,
portentous implications arise from the present diplomatic deadlock
with regard to the cooperation of developing countries and the rising
concentrations of GHGs.
Those advocating unilateral developed country emission
reductions emphasize the symbolic value of cuts by developed
countries which, according to them, will motivate and encourage
developing countries to follow suit.171 This is an unfounded
premise. Kyoto proponents mystifyingly claim that even though
defiant developing nations have obdurately refused to undertake
any reductions of carbon dioxide emissions, the United States
nevertheless must set a moral example by accepting the costs of the
Kyoto Protocol. By such selfless action the United States will shame
other misguided nations into becoming responsible members of the
community of nations by accepting carbon dioxide reductions.172
While this might be a good script for a morality play, the inter-
national community of nations functions within a hard world of
Realpolitik. All nations are fully aware of their statuses as co-equal
sovereign entities and behave as rational entities who pursue their
168. See Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 66, 68-
69 (Mar./Apr. 1998).
169. See id.
170. The issue of binding emission controls on developing countries did not even make it
to the agenda at the fourth conference of the parties (COP-4) at Buenos Aires in Nov. 1998. The
efforts of the United States to include developed countries in the effort to stabilize GHGs were
successfully thwarted by China and the "Group of 77." See Climate Change: Proposal to Require
Developing Countries to Reduce Emissions Rebuffed by China, 29 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1337-38 (Nov. 6,
1998). While Argentina agreed to voluntary emissions limitations, they are exceptions to the
overwhelming opposition of developing countries to submit to any GHG limitations. See
William K. Stevens, Argentina Takes a Lead in Setting Goals on Greenhouse Gasses, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12,1998, at A7.
171. See Alex G. Hanafi, Note, Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an
Effective International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV. ENVT. L. REV. 441, 459
(1998).
172. Another problem with this strategy is that it is unclear when a country would be
considered at the proper stage of economic development for moving to "developed" status,
particularly if doing so leads to loss of eligibility in favorable economic development
programs. See Cooper, supra note 168, at 78.
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own national interests, expecting others to do the same. And that, as
we have seen, is precisely what nations have done. It makes no
sense to require one segment of the community of nations to forebear
or desist from conduct which other members are free to carry out.
Even more poignantly, it is nonsense to allow one section of the
community of nations to flood mine shafts that are simultaneously
being drained by others.
Second, the argument for unilateral developing country
reductions assumes that developed countries will meet the un-
realistic short-term obligations of the Kyoto Protocol. Such an
assumption flies in the face of the available evidence.173 While the
Kyoto Protocol demands at least a 5% reduction from 1990 levels in
carbon dioxide emissions, according to the most recent Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) evidence from
twenty-nine industrialized (developed) countries, carbon dioxide
emissions by energy use have increased 9% since 1990, now
accounting for 54% of global carbon dioxide emissions.174 Among
the signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, the increases were 10% in
Japan, 12% in North America, and 16% in Australia. 175 According to
other estimates, U.S. emissions are likely to be 20 to 25% above 1990
levels by the year 200776
Moreover, the U.S. has a 7% reduction target under the Kyoto
Protocol 1990 figure, the European Union has an 8% reduction target
and Japan has a 6% reduction target.177 But U.S. population growth
over the twenty-year period to 2010 is forecast as 20%, whereas in
Western Europe and Japan growth is projected at 2 to 3%.178 The
U.S. has a much harder target to achieve, given the projected increase
in its population. To achieve the 7% cuts below 1990 levels required
by the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. would need to reduce its carbon
dioxide emissions by at least 30% in the space of four years and this
according to some commentators is "simply laughable." 179
173. Even if industrialized countries complied with the Kyoto Protocol, the Department
of Energy's Energy Information Administration projected that carbon emissions would be 32%
greater than 1990 levels by 2001, rather than 44% greater without the Kyoto Protocol's
limitations. See Energy: Carbon Emissions Predicted to Increase Substantially by 2020, DOE Report
Says, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 439 (Apr. 29, 1998).
174. See Climate Change: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rising Across Industrialized World, OECD
Says, 23 INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 3 (Feb. 2,2000).
175. See id.
176. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 64.
177. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, art 3 and Annex B, reprinted in 37 I.L.ML at 33,43.
178. See Jones, supra note 164, at 780-81.
179. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 64.
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As to the increasing volume of carbon dioxide emissions, some
commentators suggest that developed countries could comfortably
adapt to or mitigate the consequences of a doubling of GHGs.
i80
They argue that GHG reductions, in the long term, would occur
naturally with the advance of technology, following investment cy-
cles based on demand. According to one commentator, future
carbon dioxide reductions should be left to the development of new
reduced carbon technologies and better sources of energy driven by
markets that demanded cleaner and cheaper energy.
181
The Kyoto Protocol, however, requires dramatic carbon dioxide
emission cuts by 2010, without regard to investment and technology
cycles.182 A fundamental question, then, is whether it is eco-
nomically efficient and environmentally effective to demand that a
manufacturer or utility incur significant costs in retrofitting to meet a
short-term deadline, as opposed to phasing in more efficient equip-
ment and technology as old machinery and processes become
obsolete. The clear answer emerging from an examination of a
number of industries is that it is not. A few examples offered by
Coppock are illuminating.183
Coppock first refers to the pulp and paper industry, an energy
intensive and polluting industry. 184 If the Kyoto Protocol were im-
plemented, the industry would have to undertake costly action to
reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. This immediate costly action
could not fully incorporate the benefits of a new energy reducing
bleaching process being developed which has yet to be perfected and
widely deployed. The industry would end up spending money now
that could have been invested in the new bleaching process, delaying
a natural reduction in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions.
Likewise, in the metal casting industry, new technology is being
developed that would increase the yield of the casting process from
55 to 65%.185 A higher yield means that less raw material and power
180. See Rob Coppock, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol, 14 ISSUES IN SC. & TECH. 66, 68
(1998). See also Alex G. Hanafi, Note, Joint Implementation: Legal and Institutional Issues for an
Effective International Program to Combat Climate Change, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441,448 (1998)
(citing estimates of damage from doubling of carbon dioxide pre-industrial levels using 1988
GNP as ranging from 1.4% in the United States and 1.6% in the EC to 5.3% for China).
181. See Coppock, supra note 180, at 74.
182. See id. at 66.
183. The following seven paragraphs incorporate substantially the findings and
suggestions of Coppock's discussion of the difficulties in implementing the Kyoto Protocol.
See Coppock, supra note 180, at 69-71.
184. See id. at 70.
185. See id.
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will be needed for processing, leading to less carbon dioxide
emissions. As with the pulp and paper industry, spending money to
bring the new process online, rather than on controls, benefits both
global warming and the manufacturer's costs.
Another example offered by Coppock comes from the com-
mercial building sector.186 The replacement of static insulation (put
in walls and roofs to increase thermal resistance) with "dynamic
systems" like "computer-controlled windows" and "sensor-con-
trolled ventilation systems" could decrease a building's heating and
cooling energy load by as much as 35 to 45%.187 New buildings with
such characteristics thus would use very little space heat.188 Un-
fortunately, new buildings comprise only 2 to 3% of the existing
building stock in any given year.189 Also, almost 80% of commercial
buildings in existence in 1997 will still be in use in 2010.190 Coppock
suggests that retrofitting existing buildings with dynamic insulation
systems would be less cost effective than waiting for the natural
turnover to improve the energy consumption, i.e. carbon
emissions.191
Similarly, electric utilities would have to add costly equipment
that would be used for only a few years beyond 2010.192 The equip-
ment would then be obsolete as more efficient generation equipment
became available. Because retrofitting is the only mechanism to meet
the deadline of the Kyoto Protocol, electric utilities' finances would
be compromised with the destruction of costly equipment before the
expiration of their useful lives. Forcing utilities to incur short-term
expenses will deprive them of funds that could be used to purchase
more expensive, but more efficient, equipment when the time comes
to replace current generators. Rates may be increased and the
utility's ability to bring online more efficient equipment would be
jeopardized. A much bigger return would be achieved by the "wider
use of combined systems such as cogeneration, where waste heat
from electricity generation is used to power industrial processes or
heat buildings." 193
186. See id at 71.
187. Id.
188. See PouicY IMPucAioNS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 19, at 223. Building
efficiency may also be improved by passive solar techniques. See id. at 220.




193. See id. Another helpful technology currently viable is the Potential for coal-fired
plants to utilize combined-cycle natural gas facilities to cut down on GHG emissions. It seems,
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These examples make clear that a rush to adhere to the Kyoto
deadline of 2010 will raise short-term costs considerably and siphon
off money that could be used for smarter, long-term investments that
would both reduce carbon dioxide by the same levels and result in
lower costs and emissions of supplemental pollutants.
Coppock continues his analysis by pointing out that the U.S. De-
partment of Energy's Energy Information Administration estimates
that carbon dioxide emissions will increase 30% by 2010 if no actions
are taken, requiring annual emissions to be reduced by about 400
million tons to achieve 1990 levels.194 The Environmental Energy
Technologies Division at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
calculates that U.S. emissions could be lowered about half the dis-
tance to 1990 levels through efficiency approaches costing about $50
per ton of avoided carbon emissions.195 If the burden for this re-
duction were equally spread across all sources of emissions and all
consumers bore the costs, this would result in an increase in the price
of gasoline of 12 cents per gallon.196 An estimate garnered by the
American Petroleum Institute is that "it would cost about $200 per
ton to get all the way down to the 1990 level." 197 These estimates
show considerable costs, yet the United States' commitment under
the Kyoto Protocol (7% below 1990 emissions) is greater; achieving
the additional reduction would be even more expensive.
The U.S. commitment to reduce emissions more than 30% below
what they otherwise would be in 2010 will therefore entail enormous
changes in industry and consumer practices.198 Under this time scale
of the Kyoto Protocol, the question is whether such huge efforts will
be made. The answer given by the Clinton administration is that tax
incentives, research subsidies, and trading will allow the United
States to meet its goal with price hikes of only 4 to 6 cents per gallon
of gasoline. 199 But this can be accomplished only if abatement costs
are cut in half through emissions trading with other industrial
countries, as well as by another quarter from trading with develop-
though, that regulatory hurdles destroy the incentive to utilize the newer technology, because
higher profits can be gleaned from grandfathered power facilities. See David Mallery,
Comment, Clean Energy and the Kyoto Protocol: Applying Environmental Controls to Grandfathered
Power Facilities, 10 COLO. J. IN'iL ENVrL L & POL'Y 469,473 (1999).




198. See id. at 70
199. See id.
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ing countries.200 Robert Stavens, a distinguished economist advising
the Administration, said the following of the Administration's
claims: "It is true that the impact can be relatively small-if this is
done in the smartest possible way. But if we don't do it that way it
will cost 10 times what the administration is saying."
201
V. THE WAY FORWARD
A. Future Scenarios
The IPCC has developed a range of six scenarios based on
anthropogenic increases in GHGs20 2 and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology has developed seven forecasts of climate change.
203
Between them, these sets of forecasts deal with temperature increases
of between 1 to 5oC (2 to 9oF).204 Most analysts agree that the most
extreme of these scenarios implies significant risk to the earth's life
support systems, including ocean circulation, polar glaciers, un-
managed ecosystems, agriculture and human health.20 5  It is
accepted that concentrations of carbon dioxide were fairly constant
in the atmosphere at 280 parts per million (ppm) and that this figure
has increased to 350 ppm today.20 6 While the life support systems of
the world could live with a doubling of this figure, a quadrupling
could lead to dangerous even catastrophic consequences.20 7 It does
seem, therefore, that we do need to take some preventive action
against possible calamitous circumstances. What is certain is that at
present rates of discharge, carbon dioxide concentrations will double
within the next 50 to 100 years and quadruple by the year 2150.208
A doubling of the pre-industrial concentration of carbon dioxide
poses only modest environmental and economic problems and little,
200. See id.
201. Id. at 70 (quoting Robert Stavens, an economist and professor of public policy at
Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government).
202. See IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 23, at 5. The range of scenarios, IS92a-f,
is based on assumptions of population and economic growth, land-use, technological changes,
energy availability, and fuel mix from 1990 to 2100. See id.
203. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 57.
204. Under the Massachusetts Institute of Technology model, future climate change could
be in the range from 2 to 9oF if nothing is done to curb GHG emissions. See Nanda, supra note
84, at 320.
205. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 58.
206. See Cline, supra note 16, at 26.
207. See Coppock, supra note 180, at 67.
208. See id.
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if any, economic problems if counteracted with good planning.2 9 If
the pre-industrial concentration is quadrupled, the consequences
might be disastrous. In this respect, some educated guesses can be
made as to the relationship between temperature rise and the con-
frontation of serious thresholds. For example, various models in-
dicate U.S. agriculture would have to shift to a different set of
cultivars if the 5oC threshold is crossed, because of changed weather
patterns and soil moisture. The alteration of rainfall patterns, along
with the reconfiguration of ecosystems, would likely change the
nutrient flows of Midwest soils, posing a serious threat to that
region's agricultural productivity. Similarly, bottomland hardwood
forests of Texas might not be able to rebound from fires or storms,
affecting viability of preserved and commercial forests there.
The fear is that at some point, continued temperature rise will
trigger global changes of a magnitude that does not allow for
adaptation. They would, in the language of the UNFCCC, amount to
a "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system."210 Illustrative of such change, were it to occur, is ocean
circulation. Salinity and temperature differentials in the oceans are
significant contributing factors in driving what is called the deep
ocean conveyer, a huge flow that sinks in the North Atlantic, runs
around the African cape, and empties into the Pacific Ocean.
211 Up-
welling currents from this conveyer carry nutrients to the major
fishing areas of the world.
Some commentators argue that sufficient warming could increase
precipitation in the North Atlantic Basin enough to change salinity
and alter ocean temperatures, perhaps even stopping the ocean con-
veyer.212 This might cause drastic weather consequences around the
world, surpassing the effects of the El Nifto Southern Oscillation. In
particular, it is thought the cessation of the deep ocean conveyer
209. This paragraph relies upon Coppock's research of the impact of increases in carbon
dioxide concentration in the atmosphere on agriculture. See id. at 68-69.
210. UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 2, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 854.
211. The ocean's conveyor belt works in the following fashion: the upper loop carries
warm waters from the North Pacific across the Indian Ocean, down around Africa, and up the
Atlantic Ocean. See Richard A. Kerr, Warming's Unpleasant Surprise: Shivering in the
Greenhouse?, 281 ScI. 156, 156 (1998). North of Iceland, winds absorb the heat and carry it
toward Europe, contributing to temperature differentials of as much as 10"C. See id. The flow
of the winds also increases saltiness by evaporating freshwater, making the denser surface
water sink. The colder, saltier deep water then flows to the south, completing the loop. See id.;
See also Wallace S. Broecker, Thermohaline Circulation, the Achilles Heel of Our Climate System:
Will Man-Made C02 Upset the Current Balance?, 278 Sci. 1582,1582-83 (1997).
212. See Kerr, supra note 211, at 156.
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would cool Europe significantly.213 It is thus critical that any attempt
to control GHGs comprehend the long range nature of the problem
and take practicable steps to deal with the situation.
B. An Inclusive Treaty
The first step in moving toward a long-term solution to climate
change is to include both developing and developed nations in this
earth saving enterprise. The inclusion of the developing countries
must be on the basis of the concept of "common but differentiated
responsibility" (CBDR) articulated in the UNFCCC. Any obligations
to protect the climate need not fall disproportionately on the poor
and the deprived. Given the enormous disparities of wealth
amongst nations, equity, fairness, 214 and efficiency require that dis-
charging the burden of protection should fall differentially and more
heavily on the richer nations. Climatic stability is a public good that
is of critical importance to all humanity, and ought to be protected by
the entire international community. In the absence of a system of
international government that can act to protect public goods for
collective benefit, other mechanisms should be found.
It may be necessary to work out a scheme that pays at least the
poorest of the poor countries to reduce their emissions. There is
much to commend the suggestion of one commentator that depend-
ing upon the circumstances, global environmental governance and
international environmental law should move from a "Polluter Pay
Principle" to a "Beneficiaries Pay Principle." 215 But this should go
hand in hand with other more flexible credits to developing
countries for reducing GHGs. For example, commitment by de-
veloping countries to increased amounts of reforestation, population
control measures, energy efficiency, more technology transfers, and
more investment in R&D should be brought into any carbon dioxide
reduction calculus.
This essay accepts the premise that the world can adapt to a
doubling of carbon dioxide from pre-industrial levels. While
developed countries can do so quite comfortably, some developing
213. See id.
214. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 103 (1971).
215. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 751-752 (1999). The "Beneficiaries Pay Principle" is desirable for
regulatory instruments under a Voluntary Assent voting rule, where international agreements
bind only those who consent to be bound. See id. at 737, 752. This means that those who
benefit from global environmental protection must attract non-beneficiaries to participate in
global international agreements like the Kyoto ProtocoL See id. at 752.
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countries face a bleaker prospect. In such cases, there can be no
doubt that the principle of CBDR embodied in the UNFCCC de-
mands that the "specific needs and special circumstances" of
developing countries, "especially those that are particularly vul-
nerable to the adverse effects of climate change" 216 should be met by
developed countries.217 These countries, already sorely stressed by
socioeconomic and environmental problems that cause considerable
human suffering, cannot cope with the added threats posed by
climate change. These nations may not have the money to alter
farming that might adapt218 to changing soil moisture or higher
temperatures, or to implement widespread control and eradication
programs to battle the greater spread of disease by insects or other
means.219
Developed industrialized nations are obligated to help meet
these new demands under the UNFCCC, and it is just and fair that
they should do so. Developing nations face so many other
socioeconomic and environmental problems that the added
challenges imposed by global warming may pose an insufferable
burden. For example, even modest sea level rises may pose an
ominous, even deadly prospect for island nations that are members
of the Association of Small Island States.220
Some commentators have argued that any additional suffering
by developing countries will be real but pales in comparison to the
suffering brought about by much larger forces in these countries
such as war, oppression, and poverty. 22 1 While this may be generally
true, there are numerous exceptions. Consequently, the UNFCCC
places special obligations on developed countries to help developing
countries suffering from disadvantageous geographical, natural re-
source, or environmental circumstances such as those faced by small
island countries and those with low-lying coastal areas.222 In any
216. UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 3(2), reprinted in 31 LL.M. at 854.
217. Id. art. 4(4), reprinted in 31 IL.M. at 858.
218. Seegenerally Paul E. Waggoner, Now Think Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INIL & COMP. L. 137
(1992).
219. See Jim Dawson, Scientists Say Global Warming Will Spur Disease Outbreaks, STAR
TRmuNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Feb. 19, 2000, at 7A, auailable in 2000 WL 6960904 (discussing
research linking climate change with outbreaks of cholera and the hanta virus).
220. See Burns, supra note 22, at 149.
221. See Coppock, supra note 180, at 68.
222. See UNFCCC, supra note 3, art. 4(8), reprinted in 31 LL.M. at 858-59, placing a specific
obligation on developed countries to help developing countries suffering from the effects of
climate change such as:
(a) Small island countries;
(b) Countries with low-lying coastal areas;
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event, it would be ethically intolerable and morally offensive to
permit nations to be swept over by rising seas that have been caused.
in major part. due to the activities of developed countries. There
surely must be a new international effort to save them from such a
plight.
The approach to an inclusive treaty must proceed on many
fronts, and no one formula can be applied to all developing nations.
One way forward might be to model the treatment of some, though
not all, developing nations on the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer.223 China and India held out on sign-
ing that Protocol until an agreement about compensatory financing
had been reached.224 Quite clearly, the investment and effort
necessary to control chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) does not compare
with the colossal problems of controlling GHGs. Nonetheless it may,
for example, be possible to induce China, India and Brazil to join an
inclusive treaty in exchange for consideration that is deemed fair and
equitable. Such consideration should, however, avoid being seen as
perverse incentives to these countries to emit more carbon dioxide to
obtain greater compensation.
Recognizing the wisdom of using carrots and sticks, the Montreal
Protocol also provides for trade sanctions restricting parties from
trading in CFCs and CFC-related products with non-parties. 225 A
(c) Countries with arid and semi-arid areas, forested areas and areas liable to forest
decay;
(d) Countries with areas prone to natural disasters;
(e) Countries with areas liable to drought and desertification;
(f) Countries with areas of high urban atmospheric pollution;
(g) Countries with areas with fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems;
(h) Countries whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the
production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil fuels and
associated energy-intensive products; and
(i) Land-locked and transit countries.
In particular, the United States has engaged in a multitude of tasks in 44 countries around
the world in meeting its commitment under the UNFCCC. See Jim Fuller, U.S. Programs Help
Developed Countries Cope with Climate Change, WASHINGTON FILE (visited May 22, 2000)
<http://www.usembassy.de/copS/jf1101a.htm>.
223. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, United Nations, Sept.
16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (as amended 32 LL.M. 874 (1993)) [hereinafter
Montreal Protocol].
224. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Compliance with International Environmental
Accords: Achievement and Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN ENVIRONMENrAL ISSUES
75,95 (Mats Roden et al., eds. 1997).
225. See Montreal Protocol, supra 223, art 4, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 881-82. The Protocol
regulated trade with non parties, subject to stipulated procedures, in three ways. First, it
banned the import and export of controlled substances from non-parties. Second, it banned
imports of products containing controlled substances. Third, after a feasibility study, it banned
imports from non-parties of substances made with, but not containing, controlled substances.
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number of commentators feel that trade restrictions play a major role
in preserving the integrity of the Protocol, 226 while others argue that
trade sanctions are preferable to incentives because they avoid per-
verse incentive efforts.227 While trade sanctions might not work on
their own, it should be possible to devise an astute mix of sticks and
carrots that will induce developed and developing countries to be-
come parties to an inclusive global warming treaty.228
C. Research and Development
Dealing seriously with climate change also requires a substantial
R&D program to produce new technologies that could bring about
deep global emissions reductions and still allow robust economic
growth.229  Such an effort should involve several wealthy
participating nations. Candidate energy technologies include
nuclear, solar, hydroelectric, geothermal, and hydrogen from fossil
fuel.23° Methods for safe and economical long-term storage of
carbon in subterranean reservoirs, the deep ocean, and forests are
also important research areas, as are technologies that enhance
energy efficiency.231 In contrast, the U.S. "technology initiative" con-
centrates on subsidizing the adoption of existing technologies but
226. See, e.g., Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable
Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535,580 (1992). The impressionistic
view, certainly in the United States, is that trade sanctions are the single most effective way of
forcing foreign nations to adopt stricter environmental standards. There appears to be
evidence either way. The literature is reviewed in Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the
Demise of the United States' Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and
Other International Marine Living Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25-29 (1994).
227. See Sean T. Fox, Note, Responding to Climate Change: The Case for Unilateral Trade
Measures to Protect the Global Atmosphere, 84 GEO. L.J. 2499 (1996); see also Howard F. Chang, An
Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2154-60
(1995). For a contrary view, see Wiener, supra note 215, at 757-760.
228. See Wiener, supra note 215, at 755-768 (discussing the participation efficiency of
regulatory instruments).
229. Technological options for GHG substitution include replacement technologies,
involving a 100% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, and reduction technologies, which
involve a reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide. See Edward B. Barbier et aL, Technological
Substitution Options for Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in GLOBAL WARMING: ECONOMIc
POUCY RESPONSES 109 (Rudiger Dornbusch & James M. Poterba eds., 1991).
230. See id. at 112-21, 139.
231. Carbon storage through afforestation remains effective, however, only for as long as
the forest is expanding, otherwise carbon released by dying trees offsets that stored by new
trees. See Cline, supra note 16, at 216-17. Nonetheless, Cline considers afforestation as a viable
option for three reasons: (1) reducing existing deforestation in developing countries is a low
cost alternative for reducing carbon emissions; (2) afforestation can provide a temporary
window of several decades, allowing time for technological advancement and development;
and (3) a strategy of afforestation and use of the resulting biomass for energy can provide for a
dosed cycle of zero net emissions. See id. at 217.
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would spend little in the search for long-term breakthroughs. Efforts
elsewhere are similarly dwarfed by the challenge. These concrete
steps could be treated as part of an overall planetary plan to deal
with climate change.
Far more attention must be paid to the development of new tech-
nologies for reducing GHG emissions. It will be nearly impossible to
slow warming appreciably without condemning much of the world
to poverty unless energy sources that emit little or no carbon dioxide
become competitive with conventional fossil fuels. Only a large
R&D effort can have any hope of bringing this about, although it
would be cheap relative to the cost of dramatic reductions in carbon
dioxide emissions using current technologies. The range of tech-
nological options is wide; from using solar power to produce
electricity to converting fossil fuels to hydrogen fuel and storing
(underground or deep in the ocean) the carbon dioxide produced as
a byproduct.2 32 Few of the alternatives currently under discussion,
however, can be widely used at reasonable costs without funda-
mental improvements.
Investment in R&D on new long-term technical options was
barely discussed at the Kyoto Protocol. One phrase advocating
"cooperat[ion] in scientific and technical research" was tucked away
in the text,233 but that was all; no nation was obliged to devote any
resources to R&D. Politicians love to call for more research instead
of more regulation, but there is little commitment to the long-term
development of greenhouse-friendly technology by those countries
most capable of producing it.
D. Realistic Long-Tern Implementation Strategies
As previously mentioned, it is suggested that the economies of
industrialized nations could easily adapt to the climatic con-
sequences of a doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric carbon di-
oxide.23 ' This is because the rate of change will be slow. The trend
this century has been about 0.05oC to 0.1oC per decade. Investment
cycles for most industrial sectors are rapid enough that suitable ad-
justments can be made along the way. Even agriculture ought to be
able to cope. It takes about eight years to bring a new cereal hybrid
into production, which would be needed to adjust to differences in
soil moisture, and recent experience breeding disease-resistant rice
232. See Jacoby et aL, supra note 12, at 66.
233. See Kyoto ProtocoL supra note 1, art 10(d), reprinted in 37 I.L.MA at 37.
234. See Coppock, supra note 180, at 68.
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suggests that genetic engineering can reduce this time. It also will
not be long before agricultural implements are able to make "on-the-
fly" soil-moisture measurement and precision delivery of fertilizer to
offset changes measured.
Clearly, a permanent rise in temperature will give rise to a
number of problems. Rising warmth and moisture would also
broaden the breeding grounds for insects, most notably mosquitoes,
increasing their spread of diseases like malaria, dengue, and yellow
fever.235 However, lifestyle and public health measures such as
mosquito control, eradication programs, and piped water systems,
which have wiped out these epidemics in the United States, will far
outweigh the effects of future climate change.
Even the effort to counter a possible sea level rise of 6 to 37 inches
by the end of the next century is not likely to be catastrophic. 236 In
urban and industrial locations, the cost of protective sea walls, such
as those used in Holland, will be cost effective. 237 Elsewhere the
coastline can be left to find its new level. The previously valuable
property on the water's edge will be replaced by formerly inland
property that becomes newly valuable because it is now next to
water. Obviously there will be winners and losers, but then there
always have been. Urban expansion has created more winners and
losers than moderate climate change will do.
A doubling would definitely change particular ecosystems, and
the most important question may be whether significant disruption
will result.3 Plant and animal life in bodies of fresh water and in
wetlands will face new conditions due to higher temperatures and
altered precipitation, and may have difficulty producing sufficient
organic sediment and root material to adjust. Other so-called
"loosely managed ecosystems" have more capacity to adjust. Eco-
systems in general will be forced to reconfigure into new
communities more rapidly than they have since the end of the last ice
age. But research indicates they should be capable of adjusting
quickly enough to maintain the grand mineral and nutrient cycles
upon which life on earth depends.
235. See PoUcY IMPucATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 19, at 41.
236. See U.S. Department of State, Meeting the Challenge of Global Climate Change (visited
May 22,2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/globaissues/climate/fs-
wh9904_climate_990526.html>.
237. See Kathryn S. Brown, Taking Global Warming to the People, 283 Sa. 1440 (1999)
(discussing worldwide efforts examining the impact of rising sea level and possible countering
actions).
238. See PoLIcY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING, supra note 19, at 39-40.
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We now know that ecological systems do not possess fixed
equilibria, or static stability, and are characterized by changes not by
constancy.239 Such a view sees nature in a constant state of change
and flux, and stands in marked contrast to the earlier belief that eco-
logical systems existed in perfect balance or stability.240 Many en-
vironmental lawyers and policy makers have been weaned on the
view prevailing in the sixties and seventies that law and policy
should strive to restore, and not tamper with, the primordial balance
of nature.241 Thus, much bedrock U.S. legislation such as the
National Environmental Policy Act,242 Endangered Species Act,
243
the Wilderness Act,244 section 404 of the Clean Water Act 245 pro-
tecting wetlands, and the broader non-degradation provisions of the
Clean Air Act246 and the Clean Water Act 247 are based on the premise
that nature should be preserved or left untouched. According to this
equilibrium paradigm, the absence of human intervention would
restore the balance of nature, and enable it to achieve a natural
permanence of form and structure that persists indefinitely.
248
By contrast, the nonequilibrium paradigm considers living things
and the external world not as separate static entities, but as inter-
acting components of complex dynamic systems.249  Today's
ecologists point out that humans and their environments are not
"separate, static entities," but are "interacting components of com-
plex dynamic systems," and that practically all inhabited
environments are artificial in the sense that they have been pro-
foundly altered by human cultures.25 0 Human life implies inter-
ventions into nature, which if properly managed, according to the
knowledge available to us, can be ecologically sound, and create new
239. See Daniel B. Botkin, Ecological Stability, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT, 164,
166 (Ruth A. Eblen & William R. Eblen eds., 1994).
240. See id. at 165.
241. See Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 864-69 (analyzing the confluence of
the ecological idea of general equilibrium with federal legislation of the 1960s).
242. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70d (1994).
243. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1994).
244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1994)
245. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
246. 42 U.S.C. §§ 740 1-7 67 1 q (1994).
247. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
248. See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science?, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y
F. 193,197-98 (1996).
249. See Tarlock, supra note 248, at 202.
250. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT xv (Ruth Eblan & William Eblan eds., 1994).
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environmental values.25 1 According to an important exponent of
this viewpoint, it is not always true that nature knows what is best
for other creatures, humans, and the environment.25 2 Nature often
creates ecosystems that are inefficient, wasteful, and destructive. By
using reason, knowledge, imagination and toil, people can shape
ecosystems that have qualities not found in wilderness.253
What we see, therefore, is a historic confluence of politics and
science: SD and the non-equilibrium paradigm; creating conceptions
of resource use once eschewed by equilibrium ecologists; lawmakers
and policymakers. The convergence of these two streams of thinking
have heightened the need for a re-evaluation and re-defining of the
rationales underlying environmental protection and integration in
the United States as well as globally.
Finally, a well-designed, durable institutional structure for re-
duction of global GHG emissions can significantly reduce the cost of
limits on global emissions. Here the key piece of unfinished business
from Kyoto is implementing a system for trading the rights to emit
greenhouse gases among participating nations.254 In negotiating the
details of this system, a focus on clear definitions, vigilant
monitoring, and strict enforcement is essential. The market should
be left unfettered. Many nations oppose trading in any form; others
want to restrict its use in meeting emissions commitments. If they
make it impossible to implement a plausible framework for
international trading of emission rights, the Kyoto Protocol is headed
for a dead end, obviating the point of ratifying it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two articles published after the conclusion of this essay,
reinforce key arguments advanced herein. First, the next dimension
in the evolving saga of climate change must recognize the endemic
uncertainties besetting scientific findings and conclusions about
global warming. In a recent offering of remarkable cogency, two
251. Id. at xv-xvL
252. See Daniel B. Botkin, Beyond the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New
Ecology: Adjusting Law to Nature's Discordant Harmonies, 7 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y F. 25, 26
(1996) (arguing that the revolution in environmental sciences has shown that the balance of
nature myth is not true).
253. See Rene Dubos, Humanized Environments, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENVIRONMENT
344 (Ruth Eblan & William Eblan eds., 1994).
254. When COP-6 convenes in November of 2000, a key issue will be implementation of
measures on buying and selling the right to emit GHGs, known as carbon trading. See
Environment: Commission to Moot Carbon Trading Plan, EUR. REP., Mar. 8, 2000, available in 2000
WL 8840773.
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accomplished scientists - Daniel Sarewitz and Roger Pielke -
demonstrate the extent to which the alleged scientific certainty
surrounding the anthropogenic causes and consequences of global
warming is a mirage. According to them, "predicting the impact on
climate of reducing carbon dioxide emissions is so uncertain as to be
meaningless." 255
Second, the long-term nature of climate change calls for solutions
that are both environmentally sensitive and economically realistic
within the framework of SD. Strategies for doing so must embrace
the developmental priorities of both developing and developed
countries and plot a course that acknowledges the risks of climate
change as well as the costs of mitigation and adaptation. In a
balanced and persuasive political essay, Senator Murkowski argues
for just such a bi-partisan approach.2 6 Such global strategies must
accept both the fragility of our life support systems, as well as the
potential for human ingenuity to forge solutions to new challenges.
The task of developing a framework for international decision-
making that can work for several decades is a formidable one. It is
clear, however, that it should be based upon a tripod that includes
the developing world, the importance of R&D, and the use of flexible
provisions for emissions reductions. No serious response to climate
change is possible without these three vital elements and it is time to
by-pass Kyoto and begin that challenging journey.
255. Daniel Sarewitz & Roger Pielke, Jr., Breaking the Global-Warming Gridlock, July 2000,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 55, 61 (2000), also available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/07/sarewitz3.htm.
256. See Senator Frank H. Murkowsky, The Kyoto Protocol is Not the Answer to Climate
Change, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 345 (2000).
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